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ANALOGY SANS PORTRAIT: GOD-TALK 
AS LITERAL BUT NON-ANTHROPOMORPHIC 
Barry Miller 
The impression is sometimes given that the analogical character of God-talk could be 
established only by providing an account of the particular form thatthe analogy would take. 
In this paper I argue that it can be established without having to endorse any particular form 
of analogy at all: the former question is quite independent of the latter. As I present it, the 
argument for the analogical character of God-talk is based on two doctrines. One is the 
classical theistic doctrine of the divine simplicity; the other is the doctrine that some propo-
sitions are logically simple in the sense of having no sub-propositional logical parts. 
The question I wish to address is the possibility of talking about a God that is tran-
scendent, a God that therefore differs radically from any possible creature. One of 
the more recent and impressive discussions of this topic occurs in James Ross' 
Portraying Analogi, in which we are offered a portrait of precisely how non-
theistic language might be extendable-without anthropomorphism-for use 
about a transcendent God. It is the merit of this and the many other attempts at such 
portraiture that their effect may be twofold; for, should the portrait be accurate, the 
very fact of showing how God-talk was analogical would succeed in showing also 
that it was analogical. Its demerit, if such it be, would lie in seeming to make an 
answer to the "that" question inseparable from an answer to the "how" question: if 
there were no way of showing how God-talk was analogical, we might seem to be 
precluded from ever saying that it was analogical. In the present paper I try to break 
any apparent nexus between the two, and to answer the former question inde-
pendently of the latter, i.e., without having to endorse any particular portrait of 
analogy, whether it be Ross' or any other. The fIrst thing to be said about this 
paper, therefore, is that it is a discussion of analogy sans portrait. 
Painters of the various portraits have been imbued by a common desire to show 
how language about a transcendent God can escape the bonds of anthropomorphic 
discourse2 without producing a language made vacuous by its failing to interlock 
with non-theistic discourse. Their goal is to avoid anthropomorphism without 
however being committed to the so-called "linguistic discontinuity thesis," a thesis 
which might be formulated as follows: 
Predicates said of God (e.g. " is wise", " is 
intelligent") are totally unrelated in meaning to predicates of the same 
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spelling and sound used in 'ordinary' discourse. The former have been 
described variously as being completely discontinuous with those of 
ordinary discourse, as having "broken away from its moorings", as 
having "gone on holiday". 3 
At first sight such a thesis may well seem the natural conclusion to draw, reluctant 
though one might be to do so. 
Not surprisingly, the discontinuity thesis has its dissenters. Some reject it in 
part: while accepting a discontinuity in regard to the literal uses of language, 
they deny it in regard to the non-literal, metaphorical, or symbolic uses. 4 Others 
reject the thesis totally, either because they think there is no call for figurative 
and extended uses of language, or because they think that language may be so 
extended as to be applicable even to a transcendent God, without being either 
non-literal or strained to the point of unintelligibility. Ross, for example, has 
suggested that the discontinuity exists only for those people who are "divorced 
from the practice that God-talk functions to modulate"; for such language is not 
fully intelligible, "unless you learn it, and its making sense to you is connected 
with your having or imagining a use for it to modulate living." On this view, it 
would make little sense to those who are "outsiders to the forms of life, the 
practices, modulated by religious talking."5 
Other accounts have been offered by Ramsey's theory of models and qualifiers6 
and Swinburne's notion of analogy7 according to which the meaning of a term 
is extended both by abandoning some of the syntactic rules and by modifying 
the role of the standard examples in the semantic rules. Finally, there are also 
the more ancient theories of analogy which attempt to explain the literal but 
non-anthropomorphic character of God-talk in terms of analogy of proportional-
itt, or analogy of attribution9 , or both.1O In the following pages, however, I 
shall generally be using the term "analogy" in a less theory-laden way than is 
often the case. In saying that God-talk is analogical I mean simply that, for some 
substitutions for "F," the sense of" is F" as applied to creatures 
and its sense as applied to God are so related that, 
a. its uses in "God is F" and "James is F" have similar meanings, 
b. those uses are in no way univocal, 
c. but are such that "God is F" is literally (as opposed to figuratively) 
true. 
The discontinuity thesis would be precluded by the first point, and 
anthropomorphism by the second. The third point does not deny that some 
predicates in God-talk may be merely figurative; it does deny that all are. 
In this paper I, too, shall be rejecting the discontinuity thesis, and shall do so 
by arguing that at least some predicates of creature-talk can be extended in a 
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way that does violence neither to their literal character nor to the transcendence 
of the God of whom they are said. However, since the notions of God are 
notoriously various even in the Western tradition, little can be said of language 
about God until we respond to the question, "Language about what God?" The 
notion of God that I shall be employing is one that H. P. Owens has dubbed 
"classical theism," and which is said to define God as "the Creator, who is 
infinite, self-existent, incorporeal, eternal, immutable, impassible, simple, per-
fect, omniscient and omnipotent."11 Stemming from Avicenna and Aquinas, its 
distinctive character is its inclusion of the admittedly difficult notion "simple." 
While many theists would be prepared to accept most of the notes mentioned 
by Owen, a great number would balk at God's being simple, in the sense in 
which Aquinas and A vicenna understood that term, even though his simplicity 
is precisely the note which most strikingly manifests the transcendence of such 
a God. Because simple, there is no room for any real distinction between him 
and his existence: he must be subsistent existence, ipsum esse subsistens. Again, 
being simple, he has no passive potentiality of any kind whatever. Moreover, 
because lacking all such potentiality, he not merely has omnipotence or omnis-
cience, or any other attribute; rather, he is his omnipotence, is his omniscience, 
and, in general, for any attribute F had by God, he is his F-ness. Not only would 
many oppose this claim, they would regard it as ipso facto precluding God-talk 
from being both literal and non-anthropomorphic. 
Being unpersuaded by the critics, I have chosen to operate with the notion of 
a God who is simple in exactly the sense just mentioned. Indeed, I shall be 
arguing that the criticisms could hardly be more misguided; for, rather than being 
inimical to the analogical character of God-talk, it is precisely the classical 
theist's doctrine of divine simplicity which makes such talk possible. In fact, it 
grounds both the transcendence of God and the possibility of analogical language 
about him. Thus, the second thing to be said about this paper is that it is an 
attempt not only to show that God-talk is analogical, but to show also that that 
conclusion is entailed by the divine simplicity, which paradoxically is the very 
doctrine that might seem least likely to support it. 
The plan for pursuing the foregoing aims is as follows: 
I. An attempt to defend the classical theist's notion of divine 
simplicity against the charge of being meaningless, the aim being 
to relieve at least some of the unease which the doctrine often and 
understandably engenders. 
II. Explaining why the doctrine of divine simplicity may at first sight 
seem to be inimical to any God-talk that purported to be both literal 
and non-anthropomorphic. 
III. Introducing a notion that will provide the key for resolving the 
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difficulties raised in (II). That notion is of a proposition that is 
logically simple, in the sense of containing no sub-propositional 
logical parts. Such propositions can occur in discourse that is not 
even remotely theistic. 
IV. Finally, and in the light of the earlier remarks on logically simple 
propositions, it is argued that the classical theistic doctrine of 
divine simplicity underpins an account of God-talk that is both 
literal and non-anthropomorphic, an account which therefore rebuts 
the discontinuity thesis without however having to endorse one 
form of analogy rather than any other. 
I. Divine Simplicity and the Charge of Meaninglessness 
Since this paper is concerned only with the ways in which the doctrine 
of divine simplicity bears on the possibility of God-talk, there is no need 
to argue here for the truth of that doctrine. There is, however, some need 
both to state it and briefly to defend it against the charge of meaninglessness; 
and that is what I shall be attempting in this section. Some classical theists 
claim to be able to prove not only that God exists, is wise, is intelligent, is 
loving, is powerful, etc., but to prove also that it would be less misleading 
to express these conclusions in the form mentioned earlier, viz. "God is his 
F-ness." This doctrine is often reproached for breaching the logical proprieties 
by purporting to frame an identity claim (e.g., 'God is his wisdom') in 
which one of the referring expressions is concrete, while the other is abstract. 
Prior was moved to remark, "that's just bad grammar, a combining of words 
that fails to make them mean-like 'Cat no six. "'12 
We can accept the charge of logical impropriety, however, without having 
also to accept that it reduces "God is his F-ness" to nonsense. If nonsense 
really were the result, we should be hard put to account for the success of 
so many advertisements in print, radio, and TV. If claims like "Brand X 
puts the whiteness back in your sheets" were meaningless because their 
benighted authors combined abstract with concrete expressions, advertising 
companies should long since have gone to the wall. That advertising is a 
growth industry suffices to show that even those who may well be affronted 
by grammatical and logical howlers in advertisements are also perfectly well 
aware of what they mean. "Brand X puts the whiteness back in your sheets" 
translates very simply into something like "Brand X makes your sheets white 
again." And, what is more, even non-philosophers know that it does translate 
in that way. 
Before dismissing "God is his wisdom" as unintelligible, therefore, we 
might try doing with it what we can do so readily with TV advertisements: 
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we might try translating it into a form that contains no abstract expression, and 
hence should be less offensive either to our grammatical or to our logical suscep-
tibilities. As so rephrased, it might read, "God is identical with his attribute of 
being F," or simply "God is identical with his being F."13 This, however, suggests 
a fresh objection. The trouble with the original version arose because it purported 
to identify the referent of a concrete term with that of an abstract term. What is 
said to be baffling about a proposition like "God is identical with his being F," 
however, is its seeming to express an identity which holds neither between 
individuals, nor between the extensions of attributes, but is between an individual 
and an attribute. 
Lest the last consideration be regarded as decisive, it is worth remarking that the 
offending proposition does no more than put positively what is expressed nega-
tively by "God is not distinct from his wisdom." Now, there may be some dispute 
as to whether the latter proposition could ever be true, but it is not difficult to show 
that it is perfectly meaningful. We have only to remember that a predicate "F" can-
not be meaningful unless "not -F," too, is meaningful. "Red" cannot be meaningful 
unless "non-red" is, nor "intelligent" unless "stupid" (i.e., "non-intelligent) is, 
nor "adroit" unless "clumsy" (i.e., "non-adroit") is. Similarly, " is 
distinct from his being wise" cannot be meaningful unless" is not 
distinct from his being wise" is meaningful. Now, the former occurs in "James 
is distinct from his being wise," a proposition which is far from unintelligible, 
since it is equivalent to "James' and' is wise' do not have the 
same referent. Obviously, then, the predicable " is not distinct 
from his being wise" must be meaningful also. Now, "God is identical with his 
being wise" is simply another way of saying precisely what is said by "God is 
not distinct from his being wise." And, because the latter employs a meaningful 
predicate, the former does too. 
The argument in the foregoing section might now be summarized as follows: 
1. "God is his F-ness" is intelligible if "God is his being F" is intelligible. 
2. "God is his being F" is intelligible if "God is not distinct from his 
being F' is intelligible. 
3. "God is not distinct from his being F" is intelligible if the predicable 
_____ is not distinct from his being F" is intelligible. 
4. The predicable" is not distinct from his being F" is 
intelligible if the predicable " is distinct from his 
being F" is intelligible. 
5. The predicable" is distinct from his being F" is intel-
ligible if some predication employing a predicate of similar form is 
intelligible. 14 
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6. But, "James is distinct from his being wise" not only employs such 
a predicate but is intelligible, since it is equivalent to '''James' and 
_____ is wise' do not have the same referent". 
7. Therefore, all the foregoing conditions have been met for "God is 
his F-ness" or "God is his being F" to be intelligible. 
If the foregoing argument is correct, it would be entirely inappropriate at this 
point to insist that the notion of anything being identical with its attributes is incon-
ceivable. Of course, if "inconceivable" were being used merely loosely to mean 
"unimaginable," the claim would be incontestable. However, there are many situ-
ations that are unimaginable without being also inconceivable. Thus, a non-
existing Socrates is unimaginable, even though perfectly conceivable, since that 
is just what we do conceive of when we say "Socrates does not exist." Again, 
although we cannot imagine black swans being simultaneously non-black, we 
have no difficulty in conceiving of it, as we do in saying "Black swans are non-
black": although false, self-contradictory propositions are not meaningless. The 
same kind of point can be made in regard to something being identical with its 
properties. We need to distinguish between imagining it and conceiving it; and, 
though the former is impossible, the latter is not. Indeed, that is exactly what we do 
when we attach to "God" the predicable" is not distinct from his 
attributes." Conceivability is independent of imaginability, no less than it is of 
truth. And God's being identical with his attributes is quite conceivable, irrespec-
tive of whether it be true or false, imaginable or unimaginable. 
II. Why the Divine Simplicity Appears to Pose a Problem for God-Talk 
God's simplicity means, among other things, that no distinction can be drawn 
between the divine essence or nature and the divine existence. It means, too, that 
there can be no real distinction between God and his attributes. This has implica-
tions not only for the syntax of language about God, but for its semantics as well. 
The syntactical point is that propositions like "God is F" are peculiarly inappropri-
ate. This is because they are not simple. Rather, they are complex in the sense that 
they contain a name and a predicate which, on the Fregean analysis, are related to 
each other as a complete expression to an incomplete one. The correlative onto-
logical point is that, if "God is F" were an appropriate way of speaking about 
God, then he would be conceivable as related to his property of being F as a 
complete entity to an incomplete one. If, in addition, God's property of being 
F were a real property rather than merely a Cambridge one l5 , we might infer 
from the truth of "God is F" that God could properly be conceived of as not 
being identical with his property of being F. 
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Of course, it would not matter if God were conceived of as not being identical 
with such of his properties as being popular, obeyed, adored, admired, ridiculed, 
for they are all merely Cambridge properties; and the divine simplicity does not de-
mand that God be identical with his Cambridge properties. It does, however, re-
quire him to be identical with his real properties like existing, being intelligent, 
being wise, and being compassionate. Einstein may receive the predicate " __ _ 
is intelligent," Socrates the predicate" is wise," and Albert Schweizer 
the predicate" is compassionate"; but, strictly speaking, God can 
receive none of them. This is not because they are somehow unworthy of him, 
but simply because they are predicates which refer to real properties. For that 
reason, not even the first-level predicate" exists"16 can strictly 
speaking be said of God. 
A striking consequence of saying that no predicate can strictly be said of God, 
is that such a God can strictly speaking not be named, the argument for which 
conclusion is as follows: 
If there were even one first-level predicate (e.g. " is 
wise") whose gap could not be filled by expression "NN", then "NN" 
could not be a proper name. 
But, there are such predicates, for no expression that is strictly appro-
priate for referring to the God of classical theism could fill the gap in 
_____ is wise", for example. 
Therefore, no expression appropriate to the God of classical theism 
could be a proper name, i.e. strictly speaking, there can be no proper 
name for God. 
The first premiss is making a purely syntactical point rather than a semantical 
one. It is not saying that "NN is wise" should be true, nor even that it should 
be not be as incongruous as "Mt. Everest is wise" would be. It is saying simply 
that "NN" should be no less a gap-filler for" is wise" than "Mt. 
Everest" is. The second premiss is simply a corollary of the previous conclusion 
that God's identity with his real properties precludes the predicate " ____ _ 
is wise" from strictly being said of him. This point will be still more evident in 
Section III, where I shall argue that the only expressions strictly appropriate to 
God-talk are propositions that are devoid of sub-propositional parts: no proposi-
tion, not even one devoid of sub-propositional parts, is a possible gap-filler for 
_____ is wise." 
To have accepted the strict propriety of using a name and first-level predicates 
of God would have been to accept that there was a distinction to be drawn 
between the referent of the name and the attributes to which the predicates refer. 
We should therefore have had to admit that there was, after all, a distinction 
between him and his existence, and between him and his attributes, and thus 
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that he was not absolutely simple. We had a choice-either to say that God was 
absolutely simple, or to say that he could have a name and receive first-level 
predicates that refer to real rather than to merely Cambridge properties. What 
we could not do consistently was to affirm both these positions together. It is 
not that we could not name God, though some superior being could: the fact is 
that not even God could name God. That alone, incidentally, is enough to show 
that God's simplicity bespeaks rather more than lack of physical parts, for such 
a lack would itself be no bar to his being named, e.g., although points lack 
physical parts, they can readily be named. 
Having reached the foregoing conclusion, let me stress immediately that I am 
neither saying nor implying that propositions like "God exists," "God is wise," 
and "God is powerful" are useless, and ought to be abandoned. Rather, I am 
saying that, though quite useful, they may also be quite misleading. They are 
useful because, no matter whether "God" be construed as a proper name or as 
a description, these propositions have a logical form with which we are familiar 
from similar talk about creatures. For that reason, and because no alternative 
forms of proposition are available to us in our God-talk, they ought certainly to 
be retained. In retaining them, however, we need to be conscious that they are 
of a form which is appropriate to someone who is not his existence but is merely 
characterized by existing, is not his wisdom but is merely characterized by being 
wise, is not his power but is merely characterized by being powerful. If God 
were none of those attributes, but was merely characterized by them, then "God 
exists," "God is wise," and "God is powerful" might be perfectly appropriate 
for God-talk also. But, precisely because those propositions contain first-level 
predicates which refer to real (not Cambridge) properties, they carry the impli-
cation that God is characterized in certain ways, and thus is not simple. That is 
why I call such propositions misleading. So much for the syntactical implications 
of the divine simplicity. 
The semantical point becomes evident merely by comparing what we can say 
of God with what we can say of Ronald Reagan, Mt. Everest, or anything else 
in our experience. "Ronald Reagan exists" or "Mt. Everest exists" is permissible, 
but never "Ronald Reagan is his existence" nor "Mt. Everest is its existence." 
More generally, we can say "Ronald Reagan (or Mt. Everest) is F," but never 
"Ronald Reagan (or Mt. Everest) is its F-ness." That is why a God that is his 
existence and is his F-ness would be radically different from, or transcendent 
to, both the Universe and everything in it. 
In calling the difference a radical one, I mean it to be more than a difference 
of degree such as between Einstein and a moron, and more even than a difference 
in kind such as between Einstein and an amoeba. For, despite the enormity of 
their difference, Einstein and an amoeba do at least belong to the one genus-the 
genus of cellular being-even though Einstein belongs to by far the higher of 
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the two species. But nothing comparable is true of a God that is identical with 
his attributes. Because he is each of his attributes, whereas an amoeba is not, 
we cannot say that God and the amoeba, nor God and Einstein, nor God and 
anything else belong to the one genus. Hence, as Aquinas17 pointed out, God 
cannot be a substance. Tillich'8 , also, said as much in declaring that God is not 
a being. There is literally not one thing nor any created attribute from which 
God and his attributes do not differ in this radical fashion. Nor is the difficulty 
removed by saying that God is infinitely wise, compassionate, intelligent, and 
so on. For, while that is true, it is (or should be) just another way of saying that 
his attributes differ radically from those of his creatures. For that reason, all 
attempts to say anything positive about such a God seem predestined to failure. 
Here, then, is a dilemma. If we want to say that God is so different from 
creatures as to be self-existent, identical with all his attributes, not a substance, 
not a being, we find that the only language available to us is one that is applicable 
to things that are not infinite, and are beings. Thus, we seem constrained to a 
silence, which could be broken only under pain of attributing to God qualities 
that differ merely in degree from those had by Socrates, Albert Schweizer, or 
Einstein. That is to say, language about God would seem to be irredeemably 
vacuous. This particular dilemma would not arise if God-talk were taken to be 
saying about God something either merely negative, or merely relational, or 
both, e.g., if "God is wise" were interpreted either as saying no more than "God 
is not wise in the way that human beings are wise," or as "God is the cause of 
wisdom in creatures," or both. 19 Nor would it arise if all God-talk were either 
metaphorical or symbolic (although such theories are scarcely uncontentious). 
It arises only for a God-talk which claims to be not only positive and often 
non-relational, but asks to be taken literally as well. 
So the divine transcendence, no less than the divine simplicity, threatens the 
very possibility of saying about God anything that is positive rather than merely 
negative, and to be taken literally rather than merely figuratively. The divine 
transcendence might lead us to think that a literal use of language could never 
say anything positive and non-relational about God. And the divine simplicity 
might suggest that the very logical structure, as distinct from the semantics, of 
language about creatures rendered it totally unsuited to God-talk. 
III. Simple Propositions are the Most Appropriate for God-Talk 
Having just remarked that the logical structure of language about creatures 
makes it less than suitable for talking about the God of classical theism, I want 
now to draw attention to propositions having a logical structure that is notably 
appropriate for God-talk, namely, propositions with no logical parts whatever. 2o 
If this seems a bizarre suggestion, the reason may lie in our accepting unquestion-
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ingly that propositions must always say something about something-that not 
only must predications always be propositions, but propositions must always be 
predications. 21 
The last claim has only to be stated explicitly to be recognized as rather less 
than tautological, for what suffices to characterize a proposition does not suffice 
for a predication. To be a proposition it is enough that an expression be a bearer 
of truth-value; to be a predication, however, an expression has not only to be a 
bearer of truth-value, but has also to say something about something. All predi-
cations, of course, must be logically complex, containing at least two logical 
parts, either subject and predicate, or predicable and higher-level predicate. But, 
what of the converse? Are all propositions predications~xpressions saying 
something about something, and hence logically complex? Or, could there not 
be propositions that merely said something (with a truth-value), though without 
saying something about something? In approaching these questions we might 
ponder the warning implicit in Waismann's remarks that, 
by growing up in a certain language, by thinking in its semantic and 
syntactical grooves, we acquire a certain more or less uniform outlook 
on the world-an outlook we are scarcely aware of until (say) by coming 
across a language of a totally different structure we are shocked into 
seeing the oddity of the obvious, or what seemed to be obvious. 22 
That we may have grown accustomed to think that all propositions must be 
about something is not sufficient to show either that they are so as a matter of 
fact, still less as a matter of necessity. I suggest not only that some could well 
be otherwise, but even that they need not be limited to the more esoteric areas 
of discourse. A striking example seems to occur in a novel by Clemens Brentano: 
"Grossmutter, da ist eine Maus drin! Mrt wie es klappert! da ist eine Maus 
drin"23 (Grandmother, there is a mouse inside! Hark at the rattling (or, at how 
it rattles)! There is a mouse inside!") Here the "es," being neuter, cannot refer 
back to the feminine "eine Maus." Consequently, it cannot be a referring expres-
sion, but has to be construed as merely a grammatical filler. The result is that, 
since the proposition "Es klappert" contains no referring expression, it cannot 
be said to be about anything. 
The same is true of the Rumanian "Fulgura," which is like some other prop-
ositions in that language in being no more than a verb stem. It contains no 
referring expression like "es" or "it," nor even the suffix "t" possessed by its 
Latin counterpart ("Fulgurat"). More importantly, it is only "Fulgura" as a 
whole-and not some part of it-that signifies in its own right. It is therefore 
logically simple. Elsewhere I have argued that propositions like "Es brennt," "It 
is raining" and "It is thundering" might also be construed as having that same 
logical simplicity, notwithstanding their grammatical and verbal complexity. If 
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so, the lack of logical parts contrasts strikingly with the presence of those parts 
even in such uncomplicated propositions as "Tom is tall," "Tasmanian tigers 
exist," and "All men are mortal." The first contains "Tom" and " ____ _ 
is tall," the second "(3x) (x )" and" is a Tasmanian 
Tiger," and the third "(x)(x :::> X )," " ____ _ 
is a man," and " is mortal." 
It may be urged that no one of the allegedly simple propositions has to be 
construed as simple, but that all are equally construable as logically complex. I 
shall not debate the point here, nor need I do so, since for present purposes it 
matters not whether they be construable as logically complex, provided there is 
nothing against their being also construable as logically simple. It would not 
even matter that logically simple propositions may perhaps entail a logically 
complex one, e.g., "Es klappert" may entail "Etwas klappert" ("Something is 
rattling"), "It is raining" may entail "Rain is falling," and "Es brennt" may entail 
"Etwas brennt" ("Something is burning"). The sole point at issue here is whether 
the notion of a logically simple proposition is an acceptable one, and acceptable 
indeed as one that may well be instantiated in quite ordinary creature-talk. Since, 
as I think, at least that much has been established in the article to which I alluded, 
there is no question of the notion being merely an ad hoc device used in a 
desperate move to overcome a difficulty in regard to God-talk. 
Propositions of this kind seem to be the only ones that are entirely appropriate 
to God-talk, at least where the God in question is the God of classical theism. 
Propositions like "God exists," or "God is wise," or "God is powerful" are less 
than appropriate since each of them says something about something, thereby 
suggesting the presence in God of the very distinctions that he is said to lack. 
Their inappropriateness need not, however, reduce us to silence; for it could 
debar us not from saying something, but merely from saying something about 
something. Now, to say something without saying something about something 
is precisely the function of logically simple propositions; which is why they 
alone would be entirely appropriate to God-talk. 
Now it may be correct to say that they would be the only kind of proposition 
entirely appropriate to God-talk, and from a logical point of view it may even 
be very helpful to do so. They do present us with difficulties, however, not 
because they are simple, but because to us they are almost totally uninformative. 
This is not so with the simple propositions mentioned above, for they can be 
grasped in their own right, i.e., without presupposing a grasp of any non-simple 
propositions. For example, a grasp of "Es klappert" presupposes no grasp of the 
non-simple "Etwas klappert," precisely because we have direct experience of 
those states of affairs which make both of them true. But the simple propositions 
of God-talk are not made true by anything of which we have any experience at 
all. On the contrary, our understanding of them presupposes an understanding 
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of certain non-simple propositions which we may arrive at in different ways-
either, as I have just done, by reflecting on what kinds of proposition would be 
appropriate to the God of classical theism, or possibly as the conclusion of an 
argument for theism. In the absence of any such route to them, a simple propo-
sition in God-talk would not be particularly informative to us. Obviously, there-
fore, if God-talk were to be at all informative to us, it could not be limited to 
simple propositions alone: it would have to admit of logically complex24 ones 
as well. Although not entirely appropriate for God-talk, the latter need not be 
entirely inappropriate either. 
IV. Establishing the Analogical Character of God-Talk 
As explained in Section II, the doctrine of divine simplicity raises serious dif-
ficulties for the possibility of affirming of God anything that would be not only 
positive and non-relational, but also to be taken literally. I want now to argue that 
the selfsame doctrine that generated those difficulties contains also the seeds of 
their solution. For that argument the notion of a logically simple proposition will 
be indispensable. 
I begin by noting three conditions for a predicable" is F" to be 
used analogically in God-talk, in the very broad sense of "analogically" defined 
previously, viz. 
a. that its uses in "God is F" and "James is F" have similar meanings, 
b. that their similarity of meaning be not construable as univocity, and 
c. that, if "God is F" and "James ifF" are both true, then " ____ _ 
is F" is being used literally, not figuratively, in each case. 
On their own, conditions (a) and (b) would establish merely that the uses of 
_____ is F" were neither equivocal nor univocal, but not whether they 
were literal nor non-literal. Hence the need for (c). It is precisely (c). however. 
which is the stumbling block. Indeed, many critics dismiss it as quite untenable, as 
witness the following objection from Nielsen:25 
If "James is intelligent" and "God is intelligent" have even one simi-
larity then at least one characteristic of God's intelligence is the same 
as one characteristic of James' intelligence. But in that case the term 
signifying that characteristic must be univocal. Therefore, to the extent 
that" is intelligent" signifies that characteristic it is not 
analogical but univocal. 
Although Nielsen frames his objection in terms of sameness of characteristics, 
it readily admits of being reformulated purely in terms of similarity of meaning. 
It would then run as follows: 
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If "James is intelligent" and "God is intelligent" have any similarity of 
meaning, then there is at least one respect in which the meaning of the 
former is the same as of the latter. 
But, then, the similarity of meaning must be simply univocity. 
Therefore, to the extent that" is intelligent" in the former 
has any similarity of meaning with" is intelligent" in the 
latter, it is being used not analogically, but univocally. 
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It might be noted that Nielsen's second premiss depends on the possibility of 
inferring from similarity of meaning between "God is intelligent" and "James is 
intelligent" to some sameness of meaning between them. That inference could 
be justified, however, only by assuming that similarity of meaning had always 
to be understood in terms of sameness of meaning, which of course is precisely 
the claim that is being contested. Thus, Nielsen's argument rather begs the 
question. Instead of being either accepted or rejected unquestioningly, therefore, 
his assumption has either to be affirmed by argument or denied by argument. 
In the remainder of this section I shall be arguing for its denial. 
Argument for the Analogical Character of God-Talk 
Nielsen has noted the theistic claim to some similarity of meaning between 
the occurrences of "F" in "God is F" and in "James is F." He is puzzled as to 
how that could be, without there being some "common core" of meaning between 
the two uses. Yet, if there were such a common core, the uses of "F" would 
not be analogical, but either partly or wholly univocal. Not only that, but the 
effect of thus predicating "F" of God would be to apply to him some core 
predicates having exactly the same senses as when they were applied to creatures. 
The result would be a God conceived of in the image of creatures-an 
anthropomorphized God. This conclusion could be resisted, he would suggest, 
only by abandoning all claim to similarity of meaning between the two uses of 
"F" and allowing that the uses were equivocal-in the strong sense of that term, 
namely, in the sense of being casually ambiguous. 
Equivocity, however, would conflict with the claim by some classical theists, 
including Aquinas, to be able to argue that certain predicates which are true of 
creatures must be true of God also. Such predicates are those which attribute 
the so-called pure perfections to creatures. In this paper it is impossible to give 
even a moderately detailed account of the argument. However, I should perhaps 
indicate at least its basic strategy26, viz. 
God is ontologically simple, i.e. he is actus purus, or actuality unmixed 
with any passive potentiality. 
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A being that contains no such potentiality cannot fail to have any of 
the pure perfections, i.e. any attribute which is in se unmarked by (not 
mixed with) passive potentiality, even though it may per accidens be 
so marked, e.g. when possessed by creatures. 
Therefore, God has all the pure perfections: hence, if F is a pure perfec-
tion had by a creature, it must be literally true that F is had by God also. 27 
Nielsen and others would claim that not even a pure perfection (if such there 
be) could be said of God and creatures analogically. In doing so, however, they 
would be misconstruing the significance of the divine simplicity. It was that 
which allowed the classical theist to conclude that God had all the pure perfections. 
It is that same divine simplicity which will now allow us to conclude that, if F 
is a pure perfection had both by God and by James, then the uses of "F" in "God 
is F" and "James is F" simply cannot be univocal, as Nielsen would maintain 
that it must. The argument will be based squarely on the conclusion drawn in 
the preceding section that the ontological simplicity of God would be expressed 
less misleadingly by a logically simple proposition than by a logically complex 
one. This will tum out to be the crucial consideration in arguing that the "F" in 
"God is F" is not univocal with its use in "James is F." 
As already noted, the senses of logically simple propositions may entail and 
be entailed by the senses of logically complex ones, as in the case of the simple 
"Es klappert" and the complex "Etwas klappert," for example. Let "P," therefore, 
be the logically simple proposition whose sense entails and is entailed by the 
sense of "God is identical with his being F."2R Since the senses mutually entail 
each other, they are obviously not unrelated. But that is not all: more interesting 
for our purposes is that the relation in question is not simply between the sense 
of one proposition and that of another, but between the sense of a proposition 
and that of a predicate-between "P and "F." The ground for saying so is that 
"P" entails "God is identical with his being F," but obviously does not entail 
"God is identical with his being G." Hence, "P" expresses not merely a sense 
that is common to those two complex propositions, but also one that is peculiar 
to the former of them. What is peculiar to the former, however, is its containing 
the sense of "F" rather than of "G." Consequently, the senses of "P" and "F" 
must be similar in some way, their difference of logical type notwithstanding. 
(There could, of course, be some other simple proposition, say "Q," whose sense 
entailed and was entailed by the sense of "God is identical with his being G"; 
and so on for the various other attributes such as his being H, being J, being K, 
etc.). 
Bearing in mind the points already noted, it can now be argued that, within 
the context of the classical theism, the senses of "F" in "James is F" and in 
"God is F" cannot be univocal. The argument is as follows: 
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A. If what distinguishes the sense of "James is F" from the sense of 
"James is G" were even partly univocal with what distinguishes 
the sense of "God is F" from the sense of "God is G", then it should 
also be partly univocal with what distinguishes the sense of "P" 
from the sense of "Q". 
But, what distinguishes the sense of "James is F" from the sense 
of "James is G" cannot be even partly univocal with what distin-
guishes the sense of "P" from the sense of "Q". (This premiss will 
be defended below.) 
Therefore, what distinguishes the sense of "James is F" from the 
sense of "James is G" cannot be even partly univocal with what 
distinguishes the sense of "God is F" from the sense of "God is G". 
But, what distinguishes the sense of "James is F" from the sense 
of "James is G" is the sense of "F" in "James is F"; and what 
distinguishes the sense of "God is F" from the sense of "God is G" 
is the sense of "F" in "God is F". 
Therefore, the sense of "F" in "God is F" cannot be even partly 
univocal with the sense of "F" in "James is F". 
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The first and second premisses of (A) call for some explanation. About the 
first, we might ask why the consequent follows from the antecedent. The reason 
is simply that the sense of "P" entails and is entailed by the sense of "God is 
identical with his property of being F." As for the second premiss, it can be 
demonstrated as follows: 
B. If "P" and "F" were synonymous, they would be either wholly 
synonymous or partly SO.29 They could be wholly synonymous, only 
if both were of the same logical type, i.e. if both were propositions 
or both predicates. 
But they are not of the same logical type. 
They could be partly synonymous, only if "F" were synonymous 
with some logical part of "P", or "P" were synonymous with some 
logical part of "F". 
But, "P" contains no logical parts, nor does "F" contain any prop-
osition (since "God is F" is an atomic proposition). 
For the above reasons, therefore, "P" and "F" can be neither wholly 
nor partly synonymous: although "P" and "F" do have related senses, 
the relation between them can be one of neither total nor partial 
synonomy. 
Having defended the first two premisses of argument (A), the only ones 
remaining are the third and fourth. The third follows immediately from the first 
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and second premisses, and the fourth is simply a truism. Hence, we are entitled 
to accept the conclusion of (A), viz. that the sense of "F' in "God is F' cannot 
be even partly univocal with the sense of "F' in "James is F." If the theses of 
classical theism are true, therefore, many of the predicates in God-talk cannot 
be univocal with those in creature-talk,3o notwithstanding their being used literally 
of him. 
Objections 
Obviously enough, two points were central to argument (A). One was that 
"P" entailed only "God is identical with his being F," but not "God is identical 
with his being G"; the other was that the expressions "P" and "F" were of 
different logical types. Some might object to both points. Against the first it 
might be argued that, since God is identical not only with his being F but also 
with his being G and each of his other attributes, no proposition could entail 
"God is identical with his being F' without also entailing "God is identical with 
his being G." In that case, however, there would be no ground for claiming that 
the senses of "P" and "F' were any more closely related than those of "P" and 
"G". The foregoing argument would thus be blocked before it even began. 
The objection rests on the claim that whether the logically simple propositions 
"P" and "Q" have the same senses is detennined by whether they are made true 
by the same or different states of affairs. That claim could be sustained, however, 
only if sameness of truth-conditions were always to be matched by sameness of 
sense. Of course, it must be admitted that sameness of truth-conditions between 
two propositions will generally be matched by sameness of sense. Not always, 
however, as witness the two propositions "X is triangular" and "X is trilateral" 
which differ in sense, despite being subject to the same truth-conditions, viz. 
X's vertices having such-and-such spatial coordinates. Indeed, that example 
alone is enough to dispel the idea that "P" and "Q" cannot have distinct senses 
if God and his attributes are identical with each other. 
As for the second point mentioned above-that expressions "P" and "F" are 
of different logical types-, it might be objected that the claim is at least debatable, 
since apparently different types are sometimes transformable or reparsable into 
each other. Thus, Frank Ramsey argued that logical subjects and predicates were 
interchangeable; others, following Quine, have suggested that names could be 
reparsed as predicables; and Frege regarded propositions as a kind of name, viz. 
of truth-values. Perhaps, then, a latter-day Frege-Quine would be prepared to 
argue that, since propositions are names, they are amenable to being reparsed 
as predicates; and, hence, "P" and "F" would not be irreducibly different logical 
types after all. Indeed, ought not both of them be treated as predicates, with "P" 
being a zero-place predicate and "F' a one-place predicate? 
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Apart from this improbable piece of philosophical eclecticism being almost 
certainly wrong on one count and probably on both, there is no way in which 
a bearer of truth-value (a proposition) could be transformed into a non-bearer of 
truth-value (a predicate), nor vice versa. Although one bearer of truth-value 
might be transformable into another of different logical structure, it could not 
be transformable into a non-bearer of truth-value. Naturally, a truth-bearer could 
often be analyzed or decomposed into non-bearers of truth-value; and, likewise, 
non-bearers of truth-value could certainly be combined to form a bearer of 
truth-values, i.e., a proposition. Considered simply on its own, however, no 
non-bearer of truth-values could ever be reparsed into a proposition, nor vice 
versa. 
As for the suggestion that "P" is 'really' a predicate (viz. a zero-place one), 
it ignores the fact that the term "zero-place" is being used as an alienans adjective 
like "rocking" in "rocking horse" and "decoy" in "decoy duck." A zero-place 
predicate is no more a predicate than is a rocking horse a horse or a decoy duck 
is a duck. And that simply serves to confirm the conclusion that there can be 
no univocity between "P" and "P," despite their senses being related in some way. 
God-Talk is not Anthropomorphic 
Although the foregoing discussion has shown that the relation between the 
uses of "P" in "God is P" and in "James is P" is not one of univocity, that alone 
does not suffice to preclude "P" from being used anthropomorphically in regard 
to God. Even if someone wanted to say that "F' in "Tibbles (a cat) is F' was 
related non-univocally with the "P" in "James is F," he would not want to claim 
that Tibbles transcended the created universe. Why, then, could "F" not be used 
anthropomorphically in "God is F," even allowing that its relation with the "F' 
in "James is P" was not one of univocity? 
Well, let us consider whether the proposition "God is identical with his being 
F" could be an anthropomorphic one. It would be simplistic to suggest that the 
mere fact of its being about God sufficed to show that it was not anthropomorphic; 
for that would beg the very point at issue, which is whether the notion of God 
is an anthropomorphic one. Until that has been settled, there are no grounds for 
arguing that a proposition is non-anthropomorphic simply by reason of its being 
about God. What does, however, establish the non-anthropomorphic character 
of "God is identical with his being F' is not the presence of the term "God," 
but the presence of the predicate " is identical with his being F." 
For example, even though" is wise" could be predicated truly of 
creatures, " is identical with his being wise" could not. Because 
that predicate can be true of no individual whatsoever, any atomic proposition 
in which it is truly predicated can only be a non-anthropomorphic one. (As 
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mentioned earlier, God is not an individual in any univocal sense of that term.) 
The question still to be decided is whether "F," too, is non-anthropomorphic 
in any way. Are we entitled to conclude that the non-anthropomorphic character 
of the proposition carries over to its proper logical parts? Certainly, we cannot 
simply assume that, if a proposition is non-anthropomorphic, every part of it 
must likewise be non-anthropomorphic; for that would be to commit the fallacy 
of composition in reverse. There is, however, another argument which is innocent 
of that fallacy. We begin by noting that our simple proposition "P" is no less 
non-anthropomorphic than is its complex counterpart "God is identical with his 
being F," for their senses mutually entail each other. Now, we have seen already 
that "F" and "P" have related senses. Yet, because "P" has just no logical parts 
at all, the relation between its sense and that of "F" obviously cannot be ascribed 
to any proper part of "P." A fortiori, therefore, it cannot be ascribed to any 
anthropomorphic part. But, in that case, "P" and "F" can have related senses 
only if "F," too, is non-anthropomorphic. Of course, it does not follow that "F" 
is wholly non-anthropomorphic, but it does follow that it is at least partly so. 
For present purposes, however, that is quite enough. 
V. Comments on the Argument 
In the course of the paper various difficulties have been raised about the 
possibility of God-talk being analogical. Principally there have been three, viz. 
1. Analogical uses of an expression are said to have different, but not 
totally dissimilar, senses. However, to say that they have different 
but not totally dissimilar senses is simply to say that they are partly 
univocal. 31 
2. For the analogical character of God-talk, there can be no argument 
that is not so wedded to one or other particular theory of analogy 
as to be unable to survive the demise of the theory. 
3. God's transcendence and simplicity preclude there being any like-
ness whatever between divine and created attributes. Hence, pred-
icates that refer to those attributes used of creatures could never be 
literally true of God, but could be used of him only in some figurative 
sense. 
If my argument has been correct, all three objections fail. They do so, moreover, 
precisely because they overlook what is implied by the doctrine of the divine 
simplicity. That doctrine, considered to be an insuperable obstacle to literal but 
non-anthropomorphic God-talk, has on the contrary been the key to removing 
the obstacles to the possibility of such language. It has done so by implying that 
the propositions most appropriate to God-talk should be logically simple in the 
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sense of having no sub-propositional logical parts. Once this was recognized, it 
could be shown that the senses of some predicates employed in talk about 
creatures must be similar to the senses of the simple propositions that would be 
appropriate to God-talk. Because of the syntactical difference between a simple 
proposition and a predicate, their senses could never be related univocally. But, 
to say that senses are similar, though not at all univocal, is simply to say they 
are analogous. And that is the answer to difficulty (1). Moreover, since this was 
the conclusion of a quite general argument--one wedded to no particular form 
of analogy-it thereby rebutted the second difficulty. 
Finally, and contrary to the third objection, it is not that the divine transcendence 
and simplicity debar any likeness between God and creatures. On the contrary, 
they are quite integral to the case for the possibility of such likeness. In fact, 
the divine simplicity is the ground for saying that, properly speaking, the prop-
ositions of God-talk should be logically simple; and it is because of the relation 
between such propositions and predicates employed in talk about creatures that 
the divine attributes can be said to be like created ones, yet without being 
anthropomorphic. Thus is rejected the discontinuity thesis mentioned at the 
beginning of the paper. 
Admittedly, the argument has presupposed the classical theistic doctrines of 
divine simplicity, divine transcendence, pure perfections, and of the possibility 
of proving that God is his being F (given that F is a pure perfection), doctrines 
which are scarcely uncontroversial even among theists outside the classical 
school. That, however, is not to its discredit, since the expressed aim of the 
paper was to discuss not the truth of those doctrines, but only their implications. 
What are their implications for the possibility of language about God, and, in 
particular, for a God-talk that could be used literally, yet not anthropomorphi-
cally? That was the question being addressed, and its answer would seem to be 
that, logically speaking, the analogical but non-anthropomorphic character of 
God-talk could be denied only by denying some of the central tenets of classical 
theism. As to whether those tenets should be affirmed, that is a question for 
another place. 
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